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Current Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT)
Deficiencies and Potential Improvements
Utilizing TSO-C91a ELTs
I. INTRODUCTION
The Interagency Committee for Search and Rescue (ICSAR) and the
Search and Rescue (SAR) community has long been aware of the
current Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT) problems.
• In a letter to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), ICSAR stated
the problem as a 2/3 failure rate and 97% false alarm rate.
The Emergency l_xx:ator Transmitter (ELT) has proven to be an effective life saving
device for the aviation community; however, two problems have plagued its operational
effectiveness since its inception. First, ELTs often fail to operate when involved in an
aircraft accident and second, they often operate when they are not supposed to, creating
false alarms. The impact of these two problems is far reaching. Its failure to operate when
it should causes lives to be lost unnecessarily which in turn erodes public confidence in the
system as a life saving device. Its tendency to transmit false alarms has also created a "cry
wolf" syndrome. Aircraft owners resent having to install and maintain a device which is
not reliable and the rescue community is forced to deal with hundreds of false alarms
annually.
Congress, in a 1986 appropriations bill, requested the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to assist the FAA
implementation of a second generation ELT.
in the
Recognizing the need to improve ELT performance, Congress in 1986 (Department of
Housing and Urban Development-Independent Agencies Appropriation Bill) urged that
improvements be addressed (Attachment 1). The bill stated, "It is not satisfactory that units
with a false alarm rate of over 97% and a non-activation rate of 70% continue to be
mandated by the federal government when an improved technical standard has been
developed and can be provided for effective satellite monitoring. It is recognized that
NASA cannot initiate the necessary administrative action to mandate improved transmitters,
but as the developer of the satellite system, NASA should urge the FAA to proceed and
should make available technical expertise to support any FAA initiative in this area."
Objectives of NASA Analysis:
- Validate the problem
- Document the specific causes of the problem
. Estimate improvements from C91a
- Estimate the benefits
- Determine the need for and benefits from an
and maintenance program.
improved inspection
NASA, in response to the Congressional report, offered assistance to the FAA, which
was in the process of developing a Notice of Proposed Rule Making (NPRM) conceming
ELT improvements. Although everyone recognized that problems existed with the current
ELTs in the field, quant_cation of the problems was lacking. Recognizing that specific
data would be necessary to support their rule making effort, the FAA, in response to the
NASA offer of assistance, asked that NASA conduct an analysis of ELT problems. The
scope of the analysis includedvalidation of the problem, quantification of the specific
causes of the ELT's failure to operate when it should, causes of false alarms, an estimate of
the improvement in performance to be expected from implementation of TSO-C9 l a (DO-
183) and the benefits to be derived as well as the need for an improved inspection and
maintenance program. The data used in the analysis is contained in Appendix A.
II. VALIDATION OF FAILURE RATES AND
IDENTIFICATION OF SPECIFIC CAUSES
A. Validation of Failure Rate from NTSB Data Analysis
Both the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Annual
Reviews of Aircraft Accident Data for General Aviation and the Air
Force Rescue Coordination Center (AFRCC) Annual Reports
substantiate, what was generally believed, that approximately 75%
of all ELTs involved in general aviation accidents do not operate.
Data from the NTSB data base that originated from the "Factual Report Aviation
Accident/Incident" (NTSB Form 6120.4) for calendar years 1983 through 1987 were
analyzed. Of the 12,744 accident reports during this period, only 3270 contained
information concerning the ELT. In these 3,270 accident reports that included ELT data,
the ELTs operated 819 (25%) times and did not operate 2,451 (75%) times. (See Table 1).
Table 1
NTSB Data from 1983 through 1987 Showing the Number and Percentage of ELTs That
Did Not Operate During Crashes Involving General Aviation Aircraft
# OF ACCIDENT
REPORTS *
1983-1987
PERCENT
OPERATED 819 25%
DID NOT 2451 75%
OPERATE
TOTAL
REPORTS 3270 100%
Accident reports where reasons for ELT Noneffectiveness/Failure
were available (Item 56 in Supplement A)
B. Validation of Failure Rate from AFRCC Data Analysis
Further validation of the ELTs failure to operate when in aircraft accidents was obtained
from the AFRCC Annual Reports for 1984 through 1987. On 544 aircraft search missions
the ELT worked 120 times or 22.1% of the time and did not work on 424 missions or
77.9% of the time. (See Table 2).
Table 2
AFRCC Data from 1984 Through 1987 Showing the Number and Percent of ELTs That
Did Not Operate in Crashes when Search Missions Were Required
OPERATED
DID NOT
OPERATE 108
TOTAL 139
#OFSEARCH
MISSIONS
1984 1985 1986 1987
31 39 35 15
93 118
132 153
TOTALS
120
PERCENT
22.1%
105 424 77.9%
120 544 100%
C. NTSB Data on Specific Causes of Failure
• 88% of the failures are crash related
• 12% are preventable with an inspection and maintenance program
The NTSB "Factual Report Aviation Accident/Incident" lists 19 specific reasons for
ELT non-effectiveness/failure (Attachment 2). Two of the "reasons" (Operated Effectively
and Test Satisfactorily after Accident) listed in the NTSB accident report form were
dropped from the analysis as they could not be evaluated as "reasons for non-
effectiveness." Table 3 below lists the remaining 17 reasons and the number of ELTs that
failed in each category during the four year period, 1983 - 1987, as extracted from the
NTSB data. It is interesting to note that 88% of the failures are crash related, i.e., "G"
switch, ftre damage, impact damage and antenna broken or disconnected, which reflects a
requirement for ELTs and antennas which are more crash damage resistant. Twelve
4
percentof thefailuresareattributedtodefectswhich,in mostcases,probablyexistedprior
to theaccidentandconsequentlypreventedtheELT from operatingin anemergency
situation.
UnderadirectcontractfromtheFAA theinformationderivedfrom theNTSBdatabase
wasvalidatedby adetailedreviewof asampleof 119casefiles. Thisstudyiscontainedin
AppendixC.
Table3
ELT FailuresfromNTSBFactualReportAccident/Incident
(NTSBForm6120.4)1983- 1987
o
*2.
*3.
*4.
*5.
*6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
*11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
"16.
"17.
REASONS FOR ELT # OF ELT
FAILURE FAILURES
Insufficient G's
Improper installation
Battery dead
Battery corroded
Battery installation incorrect
Incorrect battery
Fire damage
Impact damage
Antenna broken/disconnected
Water submersion
Unit not armed
Shielded by wreckage
Shielded by terrain
Internal failure
Signal direction altered by terrain
Packing device still installed
Remote switch off
Total:
245
12
42
2
3
4
280
356
180
62
70
17
9
14
4
3
16
1319
* NOTE: Preventable with Mandatory Maintenace/Inspection Program
D. Other Substantiating Data
• Although other data sources could not be directly correlated with the
NTSB data, they supported the finding of the NTSB data analysis.
Table 4 adds the data collected from other reports that also addresses the ELT non-
effectiveness/failure problem. The data listed under the FAA Service Difficulty Reports
5
(SDR), NTSB Special Study and the FAA Directed Safety Inspection, 1976 (DSI) columns
could not be directly correlated to all of the specific reasons for failure listed under the
NTSB 1983-1987 column; however, general support does exist. As an example, the
NTSB data attributes 245 failures to the "G" switch. The FAA SDR report lists four (4)
failures, the NTSB Special Study lists 2,228, and the DSI report lists 109. The small
number under SDR (4) does not correlate because SDRs are usually submitted by
maintenance technicians who discover defects during normal inspection and maintenance
while the 245 "G" switch failures were documented during the process of accident
investigation by the NTSB. In addition, the small number of "G" switch problems
submitted through the SDR program may be attributed to a lack of information and
equipment in the field to determine whether or not a "G" switch is functioning according to
specification.
Table 4
Reasons for ELT Non-Effectiveness/Failure Based on Various Sources
1. Insufficient G's
2. Improper installation
3. Battery dead
4. Battery corroded
5. Battery installation incorrect
6. Incorrect battery
7. Fire damage
8. Impact damage
9. Antenna broken/disconnected
10. Water submersion
11. Unit not armed
12. Shielded by wreckage
13. Shielded by terrain
14. Internal failure
15. Signal direction altered by terrain
16. Packing device still installed
17. Remote switch off
Totals:
245
12
42
2
3
4
280
356
180
62
70
17
9
14
4
3
16
1319
4 2228
40
47 53
75
27
67
1 } 266*
8 84
3
3 205
102 219
377 3115
* Fire and Impact Damage Combined in NTSB Special Study
SDR - FAA Service Difficulty Reports
1VTSB Special Study --
DSI --
109
6
15
7
4
5
23
10
3
6
13
5
20
226
Special Study - Emergency Locator Transmitters: An Overview, 1978
FAA Directed Safety Investigation, 1976
III. VALIDATION OF FALSE ALARM RATE & CAUSES OF
FALSE ALARMS
• While the percentage of false alarms is well documented, the specific
causes are not easily quantified.
The number of false alarms that are generated on an annual basis is well documented;
however, details which identify the cause of each one is seldom obtained (nor recorded).
This is the result of not having a workable follow-up system which would document false
alarm cause factors. The Rescue Coordination Centers (RCC) do record reasons, although
they are limited by what is forwarded to them by the personnel in the field who locate the
ELT transmitting the false alarm. Furthermore, the search personnel (often Civil Air Patrol
volunteers) do not have the technical expertise or the test equipment available on the spot to
"trouble shoot" a defective ELT and determine what caused the false transmission. Their
task, when they locate the transmitting ELT is to simply turn it off. Sometimes the cause
is obvious to them, from external examination; i.e., switch turned on, dropped on floor of
hangar, case corroded, etc. In this case the information is usually included in the after
action mission report which they submit to the AFRCC. However, when a defective ELT
is taken by the owner to a shop for repair, the reason for the false transmission is lost in the
process. There is no requirement for the owner or the repair shop to report why the ELT
malfunctioned nor is there a central data collection point for this information.
Consequently, the AFRCC at Scott AFB, I1 has the most current and complete
documentation available concerning the causes of ELT False alarms.
• 97% of the ELT signals reported to the AFRCC at Scott Air Force Base
are false alarms.
From 1984 through 1987 the RCC at Scott AFB opened 6,626 rescue missions to
locate transmitting ELTs. The results revealed that 6,421(97%) were non-distress or false
signals generated by defective ELTs or operator mishandling. A random sample of 265
AFRCC ELT false mission reports yielded 9 reasons for false alarms with the major
problems being the "G" switch, corrosion and mishandling. Of the 265 false alarm reports
analyzed from the AFRCC, 45 (17%) were EPIRBs, 32 (12%) were military ELTs and
188 (71%) were civilian. It should be noted that in 58% of the cases investigated the cause
of the false alarm was unknown or undetermined by the person in the field who located the
ELT and filed the mission report with the AFRCC.
The other studies and reports reviewed for false alarm data generally support the
information collected at the AFRCC (Table 5).
Table 5
Combined Reasons for False Alarms Based on Current and Post Studies
CAUSE
1. G-Switch
2. Corrosion
3. Human Failure
4. Misc. (heat, water or radiated interference)
5. G-Switch or Corrosion out of Aircraft
6. Incorrect Installation of ELT
7. Mishandling in Aircraft
8. Accidental Operation of Control
9. Accidental Operation of Remote Switch
AFRCC
17
4
48
26
ARINC
FIRs &
SDRs
403
212
62
70
45
CRI CRI
#1 #2
25 9
20
6
10. Internal Failure 2 4
11. Vibration 4
12. Repeat Offender 5
1
154 900 35
TOTALS 265 1,692 99
1 2
13. Incorrect Battery
14. Unknown (no other info given) 4
16
TOTAL
454
220
73
70
48
45
26
20
6
6
5
5
1
1,093
2,072
AWCC
ARt/VC
F/gs
SDRs .°
Air Force Rescue Coordination Center
ARINC Research Corporation
Frequency Interference Reports from the Airways Facilities Division of the FAA
FAA Service Difficulty Reports
Crash Research Institute
IV. ESTIMATION OF IMPROVEMENTS TO BE EXPECTED
FROM IMPLEMENTING TSO-C91a
As a first step in estimating the improvements that can be expected by implementing
TSO-C9 la 1, a detailed paragraph by paragraph comparison was made with the
requirements of the TSO-C912. RTCA Document DO-147, dated November 1970,
established the requirements for the current generation of ELTs that are in the field today.
This comparison of performance requirements is contained in the table in Appendix B.
The next step involved a paragraph by paragraph analysis of identified improvements
against the reasons for failure (derived from the NTSB data base) and the causes of false
alarms (derived from AFRCC data). This resulted in an estimated percent of expected
performance improvement. A team of experts consisting of former members of the RTCA
ELT committee and an experienced Search and Rescue Operations Officer was assembled
to perform the detailed analysis. The team of experts also included a crash investigator
who has also been active in ELT research and development.
A. Comparison of Old and New Specifications
To assist in the evaluation of the DO-147 and DO-183 requirements, the pertinent
specifications from each document were summarized and placed side by side in a table
grouped into five categories:
1. Performance Requirements
2. Crashworthiness
3. Electromagnetic Environment Requirements
4. Environmental Requirements
5. Installed Equipment Performance and Operational Tests
1Details of C91a requirements are contained in RTCA Document DO-183 entitled "Minimum
Operational Performance Standards for Emergency Locator Transmitters."
2Details of C91 requirements are contained in RTCA Document DO-147 entitled "Minimum
Performance Standards for Emergency Locator Transmitters"
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"PerformanceRequirements"wassubdividedinto tenareas,"Crashworthiness"into five
areas,"ElectromagneticEnvironment"intoeightareas,"EnvironmentalRequirements"into
fifteenareasand"InstalledEquipmentPerformanceandOperationalTests"into sixareas.
Theapplicableparagraphfrom theRTCAdocumentswasthenplacedineachareafor the
detailedcomparisonanalysis.(In manycasestheDO-147specificationsdid notaddress
areasaddressedbyDO-183.) Theteamof expertsthenanalyzedthedifferencesbetween
thetwodocumentsin eachareaandsummarizedtheimprovementsto beexpectedin the last
columnof theAppendixB table.
B. Estimate of Improvements in Reliability of the ELT During Crashes
• 25% of ELTs currently activate in a crash situation; an increase to
73% is expected.
The NTSB data discussed in Chapter 2 on the specific causes of ELT failure in 1,319
crashes was examined in the light of the improvements summarized in the Appendix B
table. For each of the 17 failures documented, the entire set of specifications and the
expected improvements was estimated by the team of experts. This improvement,
expressed in percentage, along with the applicable areas from the Appendix B table, are
shown in Table 6. The percentage of "Expected Improvement" was then used to derive the
remaining number of failures that could be expected after TSO-C91a is implemented. The
"Expected Improvement" and the remaining number of failures to be expected, is shown in
Table 7.
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Table6
ExpectedImprovementsfromImplementationof DO-183
REASONS FOR ELT
FAILURE
1. Insufficient G's
2. Improper installation
3. Battery dead
4. Battery corroded
5. Battery installation incorrect
6. Incorrect battery
7. Fire damage
8. Impact damage
9. Antenna broken/disconnected
10. Water submersion
11. Unit not armed
12. Shielded by wreckage
13. Shielded by terrain
14. Internal failure
15. Signal direction altered by terrain
16. Packing device still installed
17. Remote switch off
EXPECTED
iIMPROVEMENT
%
95%
95%
95%
5O%
45%
75%
10%
75%
85%
0
98%
10%
10%
75%
10%
98%
100%
APPLICABLE
IMPROVEMENTS s
A.7, A.9, B.2, D.8, E.1, E.4
E. 1, E.3, E.4, E.5
A.9, E.5, E.6
A.10, E.5
A.9, E.2, E.3, E.4, E.5
E.3, E.4, E.5
B.3, B.4, D.14, D.15
B.1, B.2, B.3, B.4
B.2, B.5
A.9, E. 1, E.2, E.4, E.5
A.3
A.3
B.2, B.3, B.4, C.2, D. 1, D.9,
D.10, D.11, D.12
A.3
E. 1, E.3, E.4, E.5
E.1, E.2, E.4, E.5
* The paragraph numbers listed in the Applicable Improvements column above refer to the
ELT Performance Specifications Comparison chart in Appendix B of this document. The
paragraphs identified provide the basis for predicting the expected percent improvement
for each reason of ELT failure.
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Table7
Analysisof 1319ELT Failures(wheredatawasavailable)1983-1987and Expected
Improvement from TSO-C91 a and Expanded Inspection/Maintenance Program
EXPECTED EXPECTED
# OF ELT
REASONS FAILURES IMPROVEMENT # OF ELT
% FAILURES
1. Insufficient G's
* 2. Improper installation
* 3. Battery dead
* 4. Battery corroded
* 5. Battery installation incorrect
* 6. Incorrect battery
7. Fire damage
8. Impact damage
9. Antenna broken/disconnected
10. Water submersion
245
12
42
2
3
4
280
356
180
62
95%
95%
95%
5O%
45%
75%
10%
75%
85%
0
12
1
2
1
2
1
252
89
27
62
*11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
"16.
"17. Remote switch off
Unit not armed
Shielded by wreckage
Shielded by terrain
Internal failure
Signal direction altered by terrain
Packing device still installed
Current Total of ELTs not Activated
Expected Total of ELTs not Activated
70
17
9
14
4
3
16
lr319
98%
10%
10%
75%
10%
98%
100%
1
15
8
4
4
0
0
481
* Preventable with an Expanded Maintenance/Inspection Program
Summary;
Current Success Rate:
The Expected Success
Success Rate.
25% Expected Success Rate: 73%
Rate is Approximately Three Times the Current
Implementation of TSO-C91a and a more stringent inspection and maintenance program
would drastically reduce the number of failures. TSO-C91a would vastly improve "G"
switch performance, slightly improve fLre resistance, reduce failures due to impact damage
(primarily due to a better mount and case construction in relation to the mount) and
significantly reduce antenna broken/disconnected incidents. A more stringent inspection
and maintenance program would reduce the number of battery problems, the number of
improper installations, the number of units not armed, the number of incorrect batteries
installed and should preclude installation of ELTs with packing devices still installed as
well as remote switches turned off.
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Thesummaryof theexpectedimprovementsis shownat thebottomof Table 7. The
current failure rate of 75% (found from review of NTSB Factual Report Accident/Incident
Form 6120.4 entries) should be reduced to 27% resulting in an improvement in ELT
performance from 25% currently experienced to an expected 73%.
C. Estimate of the Reduction in False Alarms to be Expected From
Implementation of TSO-C91a and an Improved Inspection and
Maintenance Program
The current number of false alarms can be expected to be reduced by
75% with implementation of TSO-C91a and a mandatory inspection
and maintenance program.
The data on false alarm causes obtained from AFRCC records and other data sources
(discussed in Chapter 2) were used to assess the potential benefit to be derived in reducing
the false alarms due to the improved performance of TSO-C91a ELTs. Each cause of false
alarms was examined in the light of improvements indicated in the Appendix B table and an
assessment made by the team of experts of the percentage of improvement to be expected.
This improvement was then applied to the number of false alarms by cause to derive the
remaining number of false alarms expected after implementing TSO-C9 la. The expected
improvement for each cause of false alarm (due to the improved specification and an
improved inspection and maintenance program) and the remaining false alarms is shown in
Table 8.( Note that false alarms for unknown causes were removed from the data. )
It is obvious that implementation of TSO-C9 la and a comprehensive mandatory
inspection and maintenance program would have positive effects in most cause categories.
Implementation of TSO-C9 la would result in improvements in the "G" switch; built in
resistance to internal failure primarily through corrosion control (positive separation of the
battery and electronic sections); problems with heat, water and radiated interference; and the
ability to withstand higher levels of vibration without activation of the ELT. False alarms
due to corrosion, incorrect installation and incorrect batteries could be reduced through a
more stringent mandatory inspection and maintenance program. A strong education
program coupled with fines or license suspension for repeated offenders would have a
positive effect on the mishandling/human failures which are causing a high percentage of
the false alarms.
In summary, the current number of false alarms is projected to be reduced by 75% with
implementation of TSO-C91 a and an improved inspection and maintenance program.
13
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V. INSPECTION AND MAINTENANCE
• The effectiveness of implementing TSO-C91a will be limited unless
improved inspection and maintenance criteria are established.
To validate the conclusion in Chapter II that 12% of the ELT failures were preventable
by an effective inspection and maintenance program, three sources of information were
reviewed to determine the condition (status) of ELTs installed in general aviation aircraft.
The information was collected in 1987, 1988, and 1989 from two U.S. and one Canadian
report. All three of the reports revealed that an unacceptable number of discrepancies
existed in the installed ELTs. Some of the discrepancies could cause ELTs not to operate
when involved in an aircraft accident and others could contribute to the false alarm
problem. A 1976 Directed Safety Inspection was reviewed to compare current findings
with early ELT defect documentation.
A. 1989 FAA ELT Maintenance Survey
In 1989, the Federal Aviation Administration conducted a special survey with six Fixed
Base Operators (FBOs) participating at five different locations in the United States. The
FAA provided the FBO repair facilities with an ELT field test procedure/data collection
sheet which included inspection instructions (see attachment 2). A "G" switch go/no go
test fixture was used at two of the survey locations on some of the ELTs inspected.
• 107 ELTs inspected*
• 69 (64%) were discrepancy free
• 39 (36%) had a total of 52 discrepancies
This analysis reviewed 107 of the survey forms (Attachment 3) that were completed by
the FBO repair facilities. Sixty-nine or 64% were discrepancy free while 39 or 36% had a
total of 52 discrepancies some of which could have caused the ELTs to fail in an accident or
could eventually cause false alarms (See Table 9).
* Note: 53 (495%) of the ELTs inspected by the FAA Special Survey were installed in
twin engine aircraft.
15
Table9
ELT DiscrepanciesFoundin the 1989FAA Survey(107ELTs)
# OF
DISCREPANCY DISCREPANCIES
1. "G" Switch Inoperative
2. "G" Switch Limits Exceeded
3. Low Power Output
4. On/Off Switch in Off Position
5. Battery Overdue
6. Corrosion
7. Antenna Discrepancies
8. Defective On/Off Switch
9. Portable Antenna Missing
10. Battery Leaking
11. Remote Switch Inoperative
1
16
6
5
6
3
11
1
1
1
1
TOTAL 52
• 24 "G" switches
• 16 (67%) failed
• 8 (33%) passed
tested
The FAA-furnished "G" switch go/no go test fixture was used on 24 of the ELTs
surveyed. Significantly, only eight or 33% passed the "G" switch operational test and
sixteen or 67% failed. This finding supports NTSB accident report data that documents the
"G" switch as a major cause of ELT failures when involved in accidents. The test also
correlates with reports that identify the "G" switch as a major contributor to the high
number of ELT false alarms. Obviously, if the "G" switch mechanism is not within
specification limits prior to an accident the possibility of it operating is reduced.
Conversely, if the switch is over sensitive, it can be activated by a hard landing or towing
operations thereby generating a false alarm.
B. 1987 Alaskan ELT Maintenance Survey
The Alaskan survey (Attachment 4) was conducted in 1987 by Northern Lights
Avionics in Anchorage. The results were forwarded by the Alaskan Region FAA Office to
Headquarters, Airspace Rescue and Recovery Service at Scott Air Force Base in Illinois
and to the FAA-DOT, AWS-120, 800 Independence Avenue, S.W., Washington, D.C.
20591.
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• 119 ELTs inspected
• 22 (18%) were discrepancy free
• 97 (82%) had a total of 119 discrepancies
The Alaskan survey inspected 119 ELTs and only 22 or 18% of the units were free of
discrepancies (See Table 10). Ninety-seven or 82% of the units had a total of 119
discrepancies. The high number of discrepancies may be attributed to the harsh Alaskan
climate, a lack of adequate test facilities (avionics shops), aircraft storage at remote
locations and perhaps a lack of owner interest. Unfortunately, the Alaskan climate is
unforgiving to those who encounter its harshness in a survival situation and search forces
are faced with vast remote areas that are difficult, if not dangerous, to search. The Alaskan
survey, at least in 1987, indicates that in a location where ELTs would be most beneficial,
they were in the worst condition.
Table 10
ELT Discrepancies Found in the 1987 Alaskan Survey
DISCREPANCY
1. Battery
2. "G" Switch
3. Circuit/Circuit Board
4. On/Off Switch
5. Corrosion/Rust
6. Antenna
7. Modulation Problems
8. Unknown Causes
TOTAL
# OF
DISCREPANCIES
49
8
28
6
6
5
2
15
119
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C. 1988 Transport Canada ELT Maintenance Survey
• 306 discrepancies in 1,684 ELTs
The Transport Canada report that was prepared by Leigh Instruments Limited of
Ontario, Canada in 1988 revealed 306 discrepancies (18%) in 1,684 ELTs inspected.
Table 11
Results of Transport Canada's Defective ELT Survey
TYPE OF DEFECI # OF
DEFECTS
1. Circuit Board Failure
2. Battery Replacement Overdue
3. Crash Activated Switch CG" Switch) Malfuction
4. Corrosion
5. Battery Failure
6. Antenna and/or RF Connector Failure
7. Miscellaneous Defects
59
58
46
43
37
34
29
TOTAL 306
D. 1976 Directed Safety Investigation
The Directed Safety Investigation (DSI) [RIS: FS-8330-9], Emergency Locator
Transmitter Activations, prepared by the Flight Standards Technical Division (Maintenance
Analysis Center), dated March 1976, also identified a high number of similar ELT
maintenance discrepancies. This verifies that the same basic ELT problems exist today that
were present in 1976. The applicable parts of the DSI Executive Briefing follow:
Part I.* Unwanted ELT Activations. The purpose of this portion of the survey was
to determine any causal factors for the occurrences of unwanted activations.
Total number of reports
Total number of manufacturers reported
Number of ELT units found with switch "on"
Number of ELT units found with "corrosion"
Number of activated units "cause" not reported
417
12
99
64
254
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PartIII.* AccidentSurvey - ELT Performance. The purpose of this portion of the
survey was to determine what factors or conditions are preventing the ELT
from functioning when exposed to conditions that should cause it to
activate.
The analysis of this study considered the fact that ELT integrity should
remain intact, only in survivable accidents. The unit is not designed to
withstand or operate under conditions exceeding 50g.
Total number of reports
Number of reports citing function switch in the
"off" position
Number of reports citing battery condition to be
"discrepant"
Number of reports citing "insufficient impact or
direction wrong ("G" switch problem)"
358
27
78
112
Part V.* Manufacturers Warranty/Repair History. The purpose of this portion of the
survey was to determine what defects were being found when units were
returned on warranty or for repair. Although there are 18 manufacturers of
ELTs, reports were only received on eight.
Total number of units reported on 366
Number of reports citing defective transistors and
printed circuit boards 84
Number of reports citing defective function of switches 70
Number of reports citing defective "G" switches 32
Number of reports citing defective crystals 30
Number of reports citing multiple defects 28
Number of reports citing defective batteries 18
*Direct quote from the FAA DSI
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E. Summary
There was no attempt made to correlate the foregoing surveys. Each survey stands
alone and each verifies that an unacceptable high number of TSO-C91 ELTs installed in
general aviation aircraft are defective. Some of the discrepancies could cause the ELTs not
to operate when involved in an aircraft accident and some, over a period of time, could
generate false alarms. Some lives will be lost because of ELTs that are inoperative before a
crash occurs. Also, national resources will be unnecessarily expended responding to false
alarms caused by ELT discrepancies that go undetected until a false alarm is generated.
In assessing the percentage of failures that could be prevented by an effective inspection
and maintenance program it was decided that a conservative estimate would be between
12% (Based on the NTSB data base) and 18% (Based on the Canadian study). The FAA
survey and the Alaskan surveys were considered too small of a sample and could contain
biases, although they decidedly support the need for an effective inspection and
maintenance program.
The FAA 1976 DSI also supports the above conclusions, however it was felt that this
data was not necessarily valid due its much earlier time frame.
F. Conclusions
• 12-18% of the ELT failures in aircraft accidents could be prevented
with an effective inspection and maintenance program.
• Current ELT inspection and maintenance methods and procedures are
inadequate.
The effectiveness of any ELTs, including
be realized if backed by an effective ELT
program.
TSO-C91a ELTs, can only
inspection and maintenance
The NASA developed and FAA
should be refined, if necessary,
requirement.
tested ELT inspection procedure
and established as an FAA
• ELT inspection and maintenance must be coupled with rule making
to ensure the potential effectiveness of the C91a ELTs.
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VI. HUMAN SURVIVABILITY IN CRASHES WITH AND
WITHOUT AN ELT
A large percentage of general aviation accidents result in some survivors. Review of
the data from Block 213 of the NTSB accident records revealed that 85% of general
aviation accidents result in some survivors categorized as : Seriously Injured; Minor
Injuries or No Injuries. The time between a serious aircraft accident and when potential
survivors can be found by rescue forces can have a dramatic impact on the probability of
accident victims surviving the accident. This general time/survivability relationship is
shown in Figure 1 developed by DOT, Mundo, et al. This time factor is particularly crucial
when a search is required to locate the crash site.
The importance of having an operational ELT is supported by the statistics gathered
through a review of the Aircraft Accident Investigative Report data provided by the NTSB
and search missions coordinated by the AFRCC.
A. Elapsed Search Time With and Without an Operational ELT
FrQm NTSB Data;
• 12.4 hours to locate a crash with an operable ELT
• 103.0 hours to locate a crash without an operable ELT
For the time period 1984 - 1987, NTSB accident reports document (Table 12) that it
takes 12.4 hours to locate an aircraft crash with an ELT operating when a search is
involved while it takes an average of 103.0 hours when ELTs are not operating.
Table 12
Data From NTSB Factual Report Aviation Accident/Incident
(NTSB Form 6120.4) 1984 through 1987
WAS ELT
WORKING?
WORKING
NOT WORKING
TIME FROM SAR
NOTIFICATION TO
LOCATION OF DISTRESS
(IN HOURS)
1984 1985 1986
8.7 9.2 7.9
67.4 138.3 160.7
1987
23.8
45.7
AVERAGE TIME
FOR 1984
THROUGH 1987
(IN HOURS)
12.4
103.0
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Figure 1
SURVIVAL AS A FUNCTION OF RECOVERY TIME
Percentage
Surviving 100
80
6O
40
20
"0
8 Hours
60% Survival
7
2 Days
0 2 8 32 128 512
Recovery Time
(Hours)
REF: Final Report ICSAR Ad Hoc Workin_ Grotto Report on Satellites for Distress Alertin_ and Locating.
Oct. 1976, pg. 6-15.
DOD & NSC data given in C. Mundo, L. Tami & G. Larson,
Final Report Pro_re,am Plan for Search & Rescue Electronics Alerting and Locating System.
DOT-TSC-OST-73-42, February 1974.
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From AFRCC Data:
• 12.3 hours to locate a crash with an operable ELT
• 50.0 hours to locate a crash without an operable ELT
Time saved in locating an aircraft crash with and without an operable ELT is the
dominant factor in improving the survivability from serious aircraft accidents where a
search is involved. The AFRCC Annual Reports for the years 1984 through 1987 (Table
13) documents that it takes an average of 12.3 hours to locate a crash from the time of RCC
notification with an ELT operating and an average of 50.0 hours when no ELT is
operating.
Table 13
Data from USAF AFRCC Annual Reports for 1984 through 1987
WAS ELT
WORKING?
WORKING
NOT WORKING
TIME FROM SAR
NOTIFICATION TO
LOCATION OF DISTRESS
(IN HOURS)
1984 1985 1986
14.3 16.1 9.5
33.6 119.2 18.1
AVERAGE TIME
FOR 1984
THROUGH 1987
(IN HOURS)
1987
9.2 12.3
29.4 50.0
In The General C_s_ 9f All Accidents
The above data can be used to project the expected improvement in survivability when
an ELT is used during a search for a missing aircraft. If we average the difference in time
from the two data sources ( NTSB and AFRCC records ) a projection of improved
survivability can be derived from the DOT survival curve as shown in Figure 2.
In cases where searches were not required to locate the accident it is generally accepted
that the ELT often acts as the first alert that a crash has occurred, although there is no data
source to quantify this time advantage. To attempt to quantify the survivability advantage
of a working ELT the entire NTSB Data Base period 1 January 1983 through 17 October
1988 was analyzed.
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Figure 2
SURVIVAL AS A FUNCTION OF RECOVERY TIME
Percentage
Surviving
40%
Survive
with ELT
1%
Survive
w/o ELT
I00
80
60
l 7)W--"--
39%
Difference
20
0
0 2
Recovery Time
(Hours)
8 Hours
60% Survival
2 Days
8 32
64.0.__.__
Hours
Difference
16.6 90.6
Hours Hours
128 512
From NTSB Form 6120.4, Factual Report Aviation Accident/Incident, Supplement M,
Search/Rescue/Firefighting/Medical Treatment Section and AFRCC data (See Tables 9 and 10).
REF: Final Report ICSAR Ad Hoc Working Group Report on Satellites for Distress Alerting and Locating.
Oct. 1976, pg. 6-15.
DOD & NSC data given in C. Mundo, L. Tami & G. Larson,
Final Report Pro tram Plan for Search & Rescue Electronics Alerting and Locatin_ System.
DOT-TSC-OST-73-42, February 1974.
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B. Survivability With and Without an Operational ELT
To establish a basis for projecting the number of lives that could be saved using the
improved C91a ELTs and a mandatory inspection and maintenance program, two
approaches were used. In the first approach the NTSB data base was examined for cases
with and without an ELT operating where a search was involved. A survivability rate was
calculated for both cases ( i.e. Working ELT and Non-Working ELT ). Survivability was
defined as the number of survivors divided by the total number of people involved in the
accident. In the second approach the total population of 12,744 general aviation accidents
during the period of 1983 through October 1988 was evaluated. ( The premise of this later
approach was that the sheer number of accidents would randomize the other variables of
survivability.)
From the NTSB Data Base Where a Search Was Required
NTSB records from 1 January 1983 through 17 October 1988
where a search was involved indicate that an additional 23 lives
per year could have been saved had the ELT operated.
Of the 662 accident records from 1 January 1983 through 17 October 1988 where a
search was required, the ELT operated 255 times and failed to operate 407 times. (See
Table 14) When the ELT operated 222 occupants survived for a 34% survivability rate.
When the ELT did not operate 179 occupants survived for a 19% survivability rate.
Subtracting the 19% from 34% results in a 15% survivability advantage when the ELT
operates. If the 15% advantage is multiplied by the 928 people involved where the ELT did
not work the potential for additional survivors is 139 people. Dividing the 139 people over
the six years equals an additional 23 lives per year that potentially could have been saved
had the ELT worked in all of these accidents.
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Table14
NTSBSurvivorDataWherea SearchwasRequired
( 1January1983through17October1988)
Ao
no
Accidents where
ELT was operating
Accidents where
ELT was not operating
# of
Accidents
255
407
# People
Involved
648
928
# of
Survivors
222
179
Survival
Rate
34%
19%
Survivability Advantage When ELT is Operating
34%-19%=
15%
Lives lost from 1983 through 17 October 1988 due to ELT not operating
15% x 928 people involved =
139 LIVES
Number of lives lost per year due to ELT failure
139 / 6 years =
23 LIVES / YEAR
From the Total NTSB Data Base:
NTSB records from 1 January 1983 through 17 October 1988
indicate that an additional 58 lives per year could have been saved
had the ELT operated.
Of 12,744 accident reports that were filed between 1 January 1983 and 17 October
1988, the ELT operated 4102 times and failed to operate 8642 times. When the ELT
operated, 7077 aircraft occupants survived for an 85% survivability rate. When the ELT
did not operate, 13,843 occupants survived for an 83% survivability rate.
Subtracting the 83% from 85% equals a 2% survivability advantage when the ELT
operates. If the 2% advantage is multiplied by the 16,607 people involved where the ELT
did not work, the product is 332 lives. Dividing the 332 lives over 5.8 years (1 Januar)'
1983 to 17 October 1988) equals an additional 58 lives per year that could be saved with
operating ELTs.
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Table15
NTSB SurvivorDataFromTotalNTSBDataBase
( 1January1983Through17October1988)
Aa
Be
Accidents where
ELT was operating
Accidents where
ELT was not operating
#of
Accidents
4102
8642
# People
Involved
8369
16,607
#of
Survivors
7077
13,843
Survival
Rate
85%
83%
Survivability Advantage When ELT is Operating
85% - 83% =
2%
Lives lost from 1983 through 17 October 1988 due to ELT not operating
2% x 16,607 people involved =
332 LIVES
Number of lives lost per year due to ELT failure
332 / 5.8 years =
58 LIVES / YEAR
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VII. PROJECTED BENEFITS FROM TSO-C91a ELTs
COUPLED WITH AN EFFECTIVE INSPECTION AND
MAINTENANCE PROGRAM
A. Review of Lives Lost Per Year due to ELT Failures
Chapter VI examined the survivability of occupants in aircraft accidents for the six-year
period 1983 through 1988. The examination of the overall data base of 12,744 general
aviation accidents concluded that 58 lives per year were lost (Table 15, page 27) in
accidents where the ELT failed to operate that otherwise should have survived if the ELT
had operated.
With the assumption that the operation of the ELT is a more dominant factor in the
saving of lives where a search is required, the NTSB data base was examined for those
cases where the accident investigator had filled out Supplement M of the Accident
Investigation Report. Review of these 662 accident records revealed that 23 lives per
year were lost (Table 14, page 26) in accidents where the ELT did not operate and a
search was required.
To evaluate the above results and project the potential life saving benefits the following
factors must be considered:
• The effectiveness of an ELT as an alerting device even when a
search is not required.
The 662 accident records where search information was available is
probably somewhat lower than the actual number of cases and does
not represent a complete set of data for the six-year period. In many
cases the accident investigator may not have this information
available at the time of his investigation.
Because one cannot be sure that other factors may have biased the
overall results of survivability when considering the entire data
base, these results are subject to challenge. However, the large
number of people involved (24,976) as well as the number of
accidents (12,744) over the six-year time frame should tend to
randomize the other variables which could affect survivability.
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The potential benefits in lives saved by a dramatic reduction in the
number of false alarms (75% reduction) cannot be quantified,
however, it is apparent that this reduction will improve the pre-
rescue time and therefore save additional lives.
Taking the above factors into consideration it is concluded that the potential for lives to
be saved is bounded by the results from the two data bases and an average of these bounds
appears to be a conservative estimate of the lives lost each year due to ELT failure. Based
upon this assumption it is concluded that 41 lives are lost each year due to the failure
of the ELT to operate.
B. Projected Benefits of Lives Saved Each Year
Based upon the analysis and projected improvements derived in Chapter IV, a
performance improvement of 48% (73%-25%) is projected. This translates into
aooroximatelv 25 lives oer year that will be saved due to the improved C91a ELT
and an effective inspection and maintenance program.
Although the projection in lives saved is based upon the C9 la specification ELTs
versus the C91 ELTs, the inspection and maintenance program is necessary to ensure that
ELTs are properly installed and in working order. From the results of the maintenance
studies given in Chapter V, lack of an effective inspection program will result in 12 to 18%
of failures prior to the aircraft accidents resulting in a loss of aooroximat¢lv 6 lives
oer year (e.g., a reduction in the projected 25 lives per year saved).
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VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Analysis of the NTSB accident investigation data (1983-1987) and the AFRCC annual
reports (1984-1987) confirmed the previously reported failure rate of ELTs in aircraft
accidents (75%) and the high incidence of false alarms (97%) being experienced with the
TSO-C91 ELTs currently in the field. A detailed comparison of the specification required
by TSO-C91a versus TSO-C91 was made to assess the improvements that could be
expected for each type of crash failure and each false alarm cause. The projected
improvement for each type of failure and each cause of false alarms concluded that the
success rate of the ELT operation in a crash could be improved by 3 times the current
success rate and the number of false alarms could be reduced to 114 of the number from
C91 ELTs. By examining the survivability factor of aircraft accidents, with and without a
transmitting ELT, it was projected that approximately 25 lives per year could be saved by
implementing the TSO-C91a ELTs along with an effective inspection and maintenance
program. Lack of an effective inspection and maintenance program would reduce this
projection of lives saved by approximately 6 lives per year.
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APPENDIX A
Sources of Data Gathered for Analysis
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APPENDIX A
Sources of Data Gathered for Analysis
Numerous studies, reports and analyses have been published concerning ELT
performance. Fifty such reports were reviewed as source material for the NASA analysis.
The following list of reports highlight the type of information that was available:
• DSI Study by the FAA
• CRI Reports
• ARINC False Alarm Study
• AFRCC Annual Reports
• NTSB Annual Reports
Unfortunately, very few of the 50 published documents could be used in the NASA
analysis because each of them had their own purpose or goal. Although these documents
substantiated most of the problem areas there was insufficient data to provide meaningful
correlation with the NTSB data and the AFRCC records.
In addition to the reports that were reviewed, a study of the various relevant data bases
was conducted to quantify the ELT performance and characterize the problems. The data
bases studied were:
• NTSB Accident Investigations Data Base (NTSB Form 6120.4) (1983 - 1988)
• FAA Service Difficulty Reports
• AFRCC False Alarm Mission Reports (Selected 1988 Files)
• Alaskan Maintenance Survey
• FAA Maintenance Survey
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A detailedreviewof theabovedatabasesresultedin thefollowingconclusions:
TheFAA ServiceDifficulty Reportsdid notcorrelatewith otherdatabases,
althoughtheydid substantiatetheneedfor abetterandmorefrequentinspection
program;however,thetypeof problemsreporteddo reinforcethedatafrom other
sources.
The maintenance surveys conducted in Alaska and in the CONUS by the FAA also
reinforce the need for a more frequent and more comprehensive inspection
program.
The AFRCC False Alarm Mission Reports proved to be the only current data
available to characterize the false alarm; however, past reports were reviewed and
the data combined with the results of our study of the AFRCC data.
Consequently, after review of the available documentation, it was determined that
NTSB and AFRCC data would be used as the cornerstones of the NASA analysis.
Support of the NTSB and AFRCC data was provided by other documentation that could be
correlated.
A. NTSB Data:
NTSB data was obtained from the NTSB Factual Report Aviation/Accident Report
(NTSB Form 6120.4) which in completed by NTSB aircraft accident investigators.
The following sections were used:
1. Basic Report. Blocks 67.68 and 69 (Attachment 3): Blocks 67,68 and 69 of
the basic report asked the NTSB accident investigator if an ELT was installed (yes
or no), if an ELT was required (yes or no) and if the ELT operated (yes or no).
This information was used to determine the percentage of FiTs that operated when
involved in a crash and was compared to survivor data collected from the search
and rescue section of the report.
2. Basic Report. Block 216 (Attachmcrlt 4): Block 216 of the basic report asked
the accident investigator to classify the injuries sustained by the aircraft crash
victims. Four classifications were available; A-Fatal, B-Serious, C-Minor and D-
None. This information was used to determine fatality rates for aircraft accidents
with and without the ELT operating.
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3. Supplement A, Block 56 (Attachment 5): Supplement A, Block 56 of the report
provides nineteen (19) reasons for ELT noneffectiveness/failure from which the
accident investigator could select one or more (multiple entry) reasons. The number
1 block, if selected, indicated that the ELT operated effectively and an "A" selection
is available to signify reasons "other" than the 19 listed. The number 1 block and
the "A" selection were not considered in the analysis for obvious reasons; i.e., even
if the ELT operated effectively, it could have still had some type of superficial
damage. The "A-Other" block was not used because it was not specific.
Supplement A. Block 56 data was used to identify the specific reasons why ELTs
do not work in accidents and then used as a basis for determining improvements
that could be realized through implementation of RTCA DO-183.
4. Supplement M, Blocks I though i2 (Attachment 6): Blocks i through 12
identified; (1) Whether or not a search was required; (2) The type of search
conducted; (4) When the search agency was notified; (5) When the aircraft
occupants were located; (7) Whether or not the Civil Air Patrol was involved; (8)
Whether military or Coast Guard personnel were involved; (9) Whether a distress
call was transmitted; (10) Whether a distress call was received; (11) The method of
locating the accident site; and (12) The condition of the aircraft occupants at rescue.
(Note: Blocks 3 and 6 were not used on the NTSB accident report form.) The
Search and Rescue Section of Supplement "M" was used to identify aircraft
accidents involving search operations in other NTSB data runs and to determine the
time factors involved in reaching occupants of crashed aircraft with and without
operating ELTs.
B. Air Force Rescue Coordination Center Data
AFRCC Annual Reports were used to:
. Determine the time lapse from SAR notification to location of the distress. This
data was compared with the time lapse data extracted from Supplement M-
Search/Rescue/Firefighting/Medical Treatment, Blocks 1-12, of the NTSB
Factual Report Aviation Accident/Incident.
. Determine, on aircraft search missions coordinated by the AFRCC (Years 1984
through 1987), the number of ELTs that worked as opposed to ELTs that did
not work in aircraft crashes. This data was compared with Block 69 (Operated,
yes or no) of the Basic Section, NTSB Factual Report Aviation
Accident/Incident.
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AFRCCFalseMissionRecordswereusedto (handson review):
Identify thecausesof ELT false Alarms. This information was used to compare
cause of false activations in Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Service
Difficulty Reports and other independent reports containing data which could be
correlated.
C. Other Substantiating Reports
. Federal Aviation Administration Service Difficulty Reports (SDR), in computer
format, were obtained from the Aviation Standards National Field Office in
Oklahoma City. These reports identify defects discovered during the process of
performing aircraft maintenance. They are forwarded to the FAA, on a
voluntary basis, by private industry aircraft mechanics/avionics personnel who
discover abnormal or repeat defects which they believe need corrective action
and desimination to the aviation public. The data was compared to the AFRCC
causes of false alarms, the Alaskan Survey and the NTSB Reasons for Non-
Effectiveness in aircraft accidents.
. The Canadian Feasibility Study of Potential Approaches to Upgrade Existing
Emergency Locator Transmitters was reviewed. The study contained a section
(Section 3) which identified ELT defects discovered by Canadian avionics
maintenance shops. This information was compared, by defect category, to the
U.S. FAA SDRs.
. The ARINC Research Corporation, Final Report, Control of False Alarms,
October 1979, and the Crash Research Institute Study by David S. Hall
concerning false alarms, were compared to 1988 false alarm data obtained from
the AFRCC to determine whether or not the causes of false alarms had varied
since the late 1970's to 1988.
. In 1989 the FAA conducted an ELT maintenance survey which field tested a
new method of determining whether or not an installed ELT was functioning in
accordance with published specifications. This determined the number of ELTs
that would not have operated in an accident because of an existing defect and
evaluated the effectiveness of new check-out procedures when accomplished by
private industry representatives.
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APPENDIX B
ELT Performance Specifications
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APPENDIX C
Federal Aviation Administration
ELT Performance Validation
Study
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U.S. Department
of Transportation
Federal Aviation
Administration
Federal Aviation Administration
ELT Performance Validation
Study
U.S. Department of Transportation
Federal Aviation Administration (AIR-120)
800 Independence Ave., S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20591
5o
This study has been prepared to validate the data base information used in the
NASA study titled "Current Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT) Difficiencies
and Potential Improvements Utilizing TSO-C91 a ELTs" dated 2 July 1990.
It was prepared by ARC Professional Services Group (Mr. Bemard J. Trudell and
Mr. Ryland R. Dreibelbis) under Order Number DFTA03-90-00800.
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FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
ELT PERFORMANCE VALIDATION
STUDY
15 MAY 1990
I. PURPOSE
The purpose of this study was to validate the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) analysis of Emergency Locator Beacon fELT) performance in
aircraft accidents. The NASA analysis was derived from National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB) computerized data Ides that contained information extracted from accident
reports completed by NTSB accident investigators. In order to insure that the computerized
data did not result in misleading information, the FAA requested a review of at least 100
NTSB Form 6120.4, Aircraft Accident/Incident Reports, to compare the information found
in the full report with the data contained in the computer data base.
II. APPROACH
The validation study was initiated with the review and analysis of ten (10) NTSB Form
6120.4 reports that contained a variety of ELT failure causes and crash outcomes related to
the occupants of the aircraft involved. These ten reports were used to verify the planned
approach that would be used for the validation study.
The selection of individual accident reports reviewed in each failure category was
determined by its percentage of the total number of failures in each category of the data
base examined. A minimum of two reports was selected for each category.
The examination of the NTSB Aviation Accident/Incident Report was accomplished by
a detailed review of blocks 16, (Narrative Statement of Facts, Conditions and
Circumstances Pertinent to the Accident/Incident), Blocks 67,68, 69 and 70 (Emergency
Locator Transmitter) and Block 213 (Injury Summary) of the basic document. Also, Block
56, (ELT - Reason for Noneffectiveness/Failure) of Supplement A, Supplement I, (Crash
Kinematics and Photo documentation) and Supplement M (Condition of Aircraft Occupants
at Rescue) were reviewed. In addition, the individual reports were scanned for special
entries concerning ELT performance.
An examination of the 19 reasons for ELT Noneffectiveness listed in Block 56 of
Supplement A, revealed that the reasons could be distributed to four general cause
categories that identify failure origins. The categories are Poor Design, Lack of
52
MaintenanceandInspection,BeyondSpecificationandUndetermined.Thecategoriesare
definedasfollows:
a. PoorDesign:Poordesignis definedasafailureduetoinadequatedesign
specificationsof theELT or its installation.
b. Maintenance and Inspection: A maintenance and inspection failure is defined as
one in which the problem could have been identified and corrected with an
effective inspection and maintenance program.
c. Beyond Specification: A failure attributed to "beyond specification" is one in
which the TSO-C91 ELT's operational capability was exceeded.
do Undetermined: This category was used whenever the information examined
was not specific enough to allow placement of the reason for failure into
categories a, b, or c above.
The injury summary (Block 213 of the basic report) was reviewed to identify
survivable accidents and to validate the information contained in the NTSB computer data
runs that were used as source material for the NASA ELT analysis.
III. FINDINGS:
One hundred sixty-five reasons for ELT failure (some were double entry in the same
report) were identified in the 119 NTSB Aircraft Accident/Incident reports examined.The
primary reason for failure was selected for each case and distributed as shown in Table 1.
In 12 of the 19 reason categories minor differences existed between the computerized
NTSB data base and the information entered in the docket (NTSB Accident Report).
The most significant error in data entry was in number 10, Antenna
BrokerffDisconnected. In this category the dockets reflected 10 more failures than the
NTSB data base. If this error rate exists throughout the entire data base then it is in error
by 53 percent, indicating a more serious problem than reflected in the data base.
The validation also disclosed that 26 (22%) of the 119 dockets revealed failures that
could have been detected by an effective inspection and maintenance program as opposed to
the 12 to 18% identified in the NASA study.
The other differences were considered minor, i.e., not more than three in each reason
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category.It wasinterestingto note,however,thatin reasonnumber1,Operated
Effectively,thedatabasehadthreeentrieswhile thedockethadnoentriesin thiscategory.
Theseerrorsareprobablydueto dataentryclericalerrors.
Thenumberof dataentryerrorsdetectedin thisstudyappearstobeapproximately10
percent,whichseemshigherthanwouldnormallybeexpected.
TABLE1
56. ELT - Reason (s) for Noneffectiveness/Failure
Number of Primary
Reasons for Failure
from Docket
1. Operated Effectively
2. Insufficient "G"
3. Improper Installation
4. Battery Dead
5. Battery Corroded
6. Battery Installation Incorrect
7. Incorrect Battery
8 Fire Damage
9. Impact Damage
10. Antenna Broken/Disconnected
11. Water Submersion
12. Unit Not Armed
13. Shielded by Wreckage
14. Shielded by Terrain
15. Internal Failure
16. Test Satisfactory after Accident
17. Signal Direction Altered by Terrain
18. Packing Device Still Installed
19. Remote Switch Off
0
15
3
5
1
2
2
22
27
15
7
9
1
2
3
1
1
1
2
Total: 119
The second step of the validation process categorized each primary reason for
noneffectiveness/failure into one of four groups, e.g., Poor Design, Maintenance and
Inspection Deficiencies, Beyond Specification and Undetermined. The 119 primary
reasons for noneffectiveness were distributed within these four groups or categories as
shown in Table 2.
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TABLE2
N0mber of Reasons Percentage
Poor Design 29 24%
Maintenance & Inspection 26 22%
Beyond Specification 51 43%
Undetermined 13 11%
Totals 119 100 %
Note: The definitions listed in paragraphs II a, b, c and d of this report were used to
determine the cause category distribution of each reason for noneffectiveness.
IV. OBSERVATIONS and CONCLUSIONS:
The following observations were derived from examination of 120 NTSB Form
6120.4, Aircraft Accident/Incident Reports:
. Although differences exist between the NTSB data base information and the
dockets in 12 of the 19 reasons for ELT noneffectiveness, the variations are
minor with the exception of one category. In the Antenna
Broken/Disconnected reason, (Number 10) the examination of the dockets
revealed that there were 10 more entries than in the data base. This
difference of 53 percent, if applied to the NASA predicted improvements
(Table 7 contained in the NASA Analysis of ELT Problems report), would
increase the overall expected improvement from 73 to 74 percent.
. An improved FAA maintenance and inspection program may be more
effective in lowering the ELT failure rate than projected by the NASA study.
This validation discovered that 22 percent of the ELTs failed to operate due
to pre-crash defects (discrepancies) while the NASA study reflects a 12 to
18 percent rate.
3. The docket study results were not significantly different to support alteration
of the TSO-C91a ELT benefits prediction.
55
List of Attachments:
1. ELT Performance Validation Charts (24 pages)
2. NTSB Form 6120.4, Page 1, Block 16, Narrative Statement of Facts, Conditions and
Circumstances Pertinent to the Accident/Incident
3. NTSB Form 6120.4, Page 4, Blocks 67, 68, 69, and 70, Emergency Locator
Transmitter fELT)
4. NTSB Form 6120.4, Page 9, Block 213, Injury Summary
5. NTSB Form 6120.4, Sup. A, Page 2, Block 56, ELT-Reason for
Noneffectiveness/Failure
6. NTSB Form 6120.4, Sup. M, Page 1, Block 12, Condition of Aircraft Occupants at
Rescue
7. NTSB Form 6120.4, Sup. I, Page 1, Crash Kinematics
8. NTSB Form 6120.4, Sup. S, Page 1, Aircraft Occupant and Injured Ground Personnel
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DOT Report
National Transportation Safety Board
FACTUAL REPORT
AVIATION
4 Aircraft RegistmUon Number
8 Nearest City/Place
12 Date of Accident (Nos. for M, 0. Y)
1 NTS8 Accident/Incident Number
5 Flight Number
1 I I 1 I 1 I ! 1
2 3 Investigation
1 _. Acc,dent 1 _ NTS82 Incident 2 L_ FAA Delegate(_
For collision between 6 Aircraft Registration Number 7 Flight Number
mrcraft, enter reg. no.
A Other and fit. no. for other aircraft A Ott_er
9 Stale 10 Zip Code (First 5 numbers only) 11 Acci_nl Site El_alion
Feet MSL
13 DayofWeek(F_rst21etters) 14 LocalTime (24 hour clocl<) 15 TimeZone
7.
I
16 Narrative Slatemenl of Facts, Conditions and Circums_nces Pertinent to the Accident/Incident
Additional P_sons Parllctpatlng in this AccldenVInddent InmUgatlon (Name. address, a/filiaoon, Continue on page 2 ff necessary)
17 Date (Nos. for M, D, Y) 18 Agency
NTSB Form 6120.4 (Rev1-84) Page
Attachment 3
DOT Report
NTSB A¢cidenl/Inodent Numl_lr
National Transportation Safety Board
FACTUAL REPORT
AVIATION
_N_a_mata_
46 LandMtg Gem (MuitrDle entry)
, [] Tncycle.--tixe_ 4 _ Tai|wh,--a,, retramabIe 7_ Hull 10 _"_ Ski 13 _----iH,gh Sk,o
2 L_ Tricyc,e---retractable 5 L. IT_,iwl_esi--retractaDte mares 8 _ Float 11 I Ski/wheel
3 t ITailwheel--all fixed 6 _ Amphibian 9 t I Emerg. float 12 _" Skid A Other
48 No. ot Seam
A Other
49 Still Wining Sylllm
Ine/lCk_l
t_Yes
2L.._ j No
A Other
S0 IFR EquJppiKI
1 4 Yes
2L_J No
A Other
51 Icing CertfflcatJon/EqullN)ed
(Muir, pie entry)
1 I Certified
2 _ Not Certified
 oo,0o.0
Not Equipped
A Other
S2 Engine Type
_ Reciprocating---carburetor
2 _ Rec=procatlng_fuel inle_eo
3,_ Turbo prop
4 _ Turbo jet
5_ Turbo fan
61 I Turbo shaft A Other
Ifnot
Engine
powered,
go to
t_loc_ 59
If 3 or more
engmes
enter
t_mes _n
Su_p. C
53 Engine Manufacturer
Engm Time
(Houm)
57 Engine No. 1
58 Engi_ No. 2
3 _ :Other approved inspection program (AAIP)
4 Continuous a=rworthinesl
A Other
54 Engine Model and Senes 55 Engine Rated Power
A _ HomeOower
B ___ Lbs. Thrust
C Otl_er
56 Number of Engines
A Other
A Total Time B Time Since ImH_¢tlon
C Time Since Ma_or
Overhaul
D Other
1 _ Annual
2 100 hour
3 _ LAAIP
4 Continuous alrwo_hinees
A Otller
61 Date last Inm_llon
Performed
(Not for M, D, Y)
A Other
62 Time Since m= _¢Uon
_Hours
A Other
¢1 Abtnme Total Time
_. Hours
A Other
M Source M MIIntenance InfonnalJon
I Tach
2, Flign!
31_ Hobbe
4 r_ Logl_oks Records
5 _- Estimate
6 Ptlot/OI )erstor Report
A Other
eS H_ Materlai8
ee Abcn_
1 _]No
A (Type)
B Other
N Ham_eu= Materl_ Sl=_
12_Y" No
A Other
71 Reg_ered Aim'eft Owner
Name
73 Ol:_llOr of Aircraft 1L.._JSame as registered owner
A Name:
B dba
C Other
74 Address
A
B Other
11 ISame as registered owner
Emergency Locator 1 2 A
Transmdler (ELT'J Yes No Other
6'7 Inltdkld
611R_lua'ld
"70' Aldld I_ k_,atl_lm
75 Op_'ator Certificate No.
A Other
76 Operetor Designator Code
NTSB Form 6120.4 (Rev._-84)
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Attachment 4
DOT Report
NTSB AccJdenUInc=den| Number
National Transportation Safety Board
FACTUAL REPORT
AVIATION
Accident
200 Aircraft Damage 201 Aircraft Fire 202 Explosion 203 Damage to Property 6 _'] A,rport facdity
1 _'-_ None 'f _ None I _r'--: None 1 _r--" None 7 _ Trees
2 Minor 2 I m-fhgt_t 21 i )n-fligt_t 2 ! Residence 8 ! Crops
3 _ Substantial 3 _ On ground 3 r_ On ground 3 _I ' Residential area g Fence
4 __ Oestroyed A Omer A Omer 4 _ Commermal i31_g. 10 _ W_res/Ooles
5 _ VemcIels) 11 _ Omer #rooertv
204 Inlur Y Index r Most crttlcal ,'nlury)
,None 2 Minor 3 ' Serious 4 ; : Fatal
' Inyury Summary A t 13° C O E
E'_ref 3my ,one Utg/t _er _loox; Fatal Se us Minor None Total 217 Claniflcagon
205 First Pilot [ ' ! I' ' ' t206 Co-¢)dot I J ' I 1 _ U.S Reg_sterecl Aircraft on US. SoS
, Terrltones and Possessions. or
207 Dual Sludent I i i i J I International Waters
208 Chec_ Pilot I i ,I : : i : 2 _ US. Registered A,rcraft on Fore,gn
209 Flight Engineer I I ! I ! [ Soil
210 Cabin Attendant= : [ i I 3 Ir---] US. Reglstere<::l Aircraft operated _3y a
211 Other Crew I i I } Foreign Operator
212 Psssenge_ I I : ' I [ I 4----_ Foreign Registered Aircraft on U.S.
' _ So=l. Temtones or Possessions
2_3_OTAL,BOA.O i '_ I i t i _ ' ' 5_ _,ltar.,_irc_,=,,OtherA*re. r , , , , , i J
220 Part FadurlUMelfuncbon (Muthp/e entry) 221 Incorrect Pwt (MultiDle entry)
. -    oom0onen,. , None
2. I ParVcomoonent _1 A Ot_er 21 I Part/component #I A Otr_er
3 I Part/comoonent _2 3 I I Part/component t2
A Part/Component #1 B P_t/Coml_lent _ C Part/Compommt #3
222 Part Name
223 ATA Coae
224 Manufacturer
225 Mfg. Part #
226 Mfg. Model #
227 Senal#
228 Part Condition
229 Total Time
23O TSO
231 TSI
232 Cycles Total
233 Cycles Since Overhaul
234 Cycles Since Inspection
'235 Service Difficulty Report or
Submitted _ _
236 Bogus Pert
NTSB Form 6120.4 (Re_ t-8,_i
1 _ Yes 21 i NO I _ Yes 2 _ NO 1 _'---_ Yes 2 ["---_ No
Page
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DOT Report
National Transportation Safety Board
FACTUAL REPORT
AVIATION
NTSB AcctdenUIncident Number
34 Right Wlng
35 Left Tip
36 Right Tip
37 Fuselage
38 i S_ectfy )
41 Fuel Found In _,1 Engine iMulhDle'entry)
1 [] None 7 [] Filter(s]
2 [] Lines 8 [] Selector valve
3 [] Gascolator/stramer 9 [] Fuel manifold/sp_der
4 [] CarOuretor/fuel inlector 10 [] Accumulator tank
5 [] Engine driven pump
6 [] Auxiliary fuel pump A Other
I I -
42 Fuel Found In #2 Engine (Multsple entry)
I [] None 7 [] Falter(s)
2 [] Lines 8 [] Selector valve
3 [] Gascofator/stramer 9 [] Fue_ man=to_O/spJder
4 [] Cari0uretor/fuel rejector 10 [] Accumulator tank
5 [] Engine dnven pump
6 [] Auxiliary fuel !ouml_ A Other
i3 Flight Controls,
Evidence or
Operational Fatlum
or Meitunctlo_
(Multiple entry)
1 [] None
2 [] Pitch control
3 [] Roll control
4 [] Yaw Control
A Other
44 Airframe/Structure, EvKlence of IrPFIl_ht SepKatlonlFaiture
( MuffiDte entry)
1 [] None 7 [] Right sta0tetevator
2 [] Helicopter (Complete Supp. G) 8 [] Vertical fin/ruOder
3 [] General disintegration 9 [] Canard
4 _] Left wing 10 [] Powerplant
5 [] Right wing .11 [] Cai0m/cargo door
6 [] Left staG/elevator A Other
47 Fua, Evtclence of Imprt_r Gr_le or Conlamlnelion 48' Oii,
(Multiple entry)
I _ None 3 r_ Contamination
2 [_ Improl_r gracle A Other
45 F'rol_r. E.iderme
of In-k_t
Se_ratk_/Pmlum
1 r'-] Yes
21-1 No
A Other
46 Poweq_anf. Evidence
of In-4tllght Mechanical
MMfunctlon
I [] Yes
2[] No
A Other
Evtdecca of ImproPer Grade or Contamination
(Multiple entry)
t [] None 3 [] Contamination
2 [] Improper grade A Other
51 ELT Manul=_-_u,re¢ 52 ELT Model No.
A Other
S3 ELT Battery Type
7 [] Alkaline 4 [] NicKel
2 [] Cadmium 5 r-] Lith=um
3 [] Nicad A Other
A Other
54 ELT Battery Expiration Date (Nos./or M, D, Y)
A Other
55 Pf_ ELF location(e) (MulfiDte entry/
1 [] Cockpit
2 [] Cabin 5 [] Raft
3 r'_ Tailcone 6 [] Survival Kit
4 [] Empennage A Otl_er
56 ELT-Reaeon for NonellecflvenesstFeilura (Multiple entry)
1 [] Operated effectively 6 _'1 Battery installation incorrect 11 [] Water submers4on
2 [] Insuffic=ent G's 7 [] Incorrect battery 12 [] Umt not armed
3 [] Improper installation 8 [] Fire damage 13 [] Shielded by wreckage
4 [] Bat_'ery dead 9 [] Impact damage 14 [] Shtetded by terrmn
5 [] Battery corroded 10 r_ Antenna broken disconnected 15 [] tnrernalfaflure
16 [] Test satisfactorily after accident
17 [] Signal direct=on altered by terrakn
18 [] Packing dewce still installed
19 [] Remote swrtct_ off
A Otl_er
NTSB Form 6120.4 Supplement A (_-84) Pacje 2
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DOT Report
National Transportation Safety Board
FACTUAL REPORT
AVIATION
NTS R Accident/Incident Number
;upplement I--Crash Kinematics
1 Accident Site Geographic Coordinates--Latitude (Muittote entry)
1 [] North A __ cleg __ minutes
B Other2 [] SouIh
3 Impact S,1._:_uence--iNumDer :n sequence MultlD/e entry}
1 [] None 7 [] Grouncl
2 [] ROCk face 8 [] Dirt bank
3 [] Rigid structure 9 [] Scrub Iree
4 [] ROCKS to I diam 10 [] Trees, limbs to 6" diam
5 [] Rocks 1 '-2' diam 11 [] Trees, hmbs 6"-9" d_am
6 [--_" Rocks > 2' dlam 12 [] TreesH_mbs 9"-12" cham
Accident Site Geographlc CoordlnatalP--Longltu_ (Multiple entry)
I [] East A __deg. __ m,nutes
2 [] West B Other
!3 [] Trees/throbs 12" chain and up 19 [] Runway hgnt
14 [] Frangible approach a_d 20 [] Waler
15 [] Non-frangible approact_ aid 21 [] Wire
16 [] Submerged obstacle 22 [] Pole
17 [] Vehicle 23 [] Snow bank
18 [] Aircraft A Other
4 Terrain Ill P_ncJpel Impact Point (MulttDie entry)
1 [] None 5 [] Racked snow
2 [] Wet cultivated sod 7 [] Loose snow
3 [] Dry cuitivalecl sod 8 [] Concrete
4 [] Dry packec_ clay 9 [] Asphalt
5 [] Boggy swamoy 10 [] Loose rock
11 [] Orysod 16 [] Rock
12 r'] wet sod 17 [] Ice
t3 [] Water 18 [] Mud
14 [] Tundra 19 [] Sand
!5 [] Dirt A Ottler
5 Ait_l_.,,_l At Impact (Enter chrect or mark estimated range) 6 Flight Path Angle (Enter direct or mark estlmatecl range}
1 [] 0-15 6 [] 75-90 11 [] 210 plus knots 1 [] Up 6 [] 15-20 11 [] 60-90
2 [] 15-30 7 [] 90-120 A __ Knots 2 [] Down 7 [] 20-25 A __ Degrees
3 [] 30-45 8 [] 120-150 B Other 3 [] 0-5 8 [] 25-30 B Other
4 [] 45-60 9 [] _50-180 4 [] 5-10 9 [] 30-45
5 [] 60-75 10 [] 180-210 5 [] 10-15 10 [] 45--60
7 Pitch Attitude At Impact (Enter direct or mart< esttmateG range.)
Pitch Attntude
t [] Down
2 [] Up
A __Deg.
Nose Down Angde With Honzon Nose Up Angle With Horizon
[] 75 _ 60[] 45 _ 30[] 15[] 0[] 15[] 30[-I 45[-] 60[-I 75_
90 [] 75[-1 60[] 45 _ 30[7 15_ O[] 1S_ 30[] 45 [] 60[-] 751--I 901--[
or Other
[8 Roll Attitude At Impact (Enter direct or marl( estimated range.)
Aircraft Rolled Left Aircraft Rolled Right
Roll
1 [] Left
2 [] R_ght
A __Deg
[]i05[]120[]_35[]i_0[]_e5[]lao[]leS[]_sor'1135[]_20[]i05[]
90i--]75 [-I 60_ 451--] 30 I-] 15_ OF'] 15[-] 30r-I 45 [-] 60 [-175_ 90 _ I
a
or Other
NTSB Form 6120.4 Supplement 111-84) Page1
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National Transportation Safety Board
FACTUAL REPORT
AVIATION
,;upplement I--Crash Kinematics continued
9 Yaw Attitude at Iml_b¢l (Enter direct or mart< eshmated range)
Attachment 6 (Continued)
DOT Report
NTSB Accident/Incident Number
[] Nose le. 1
2 [] Nose r,gnt
A _ Oeg
I
10 Terrain Angle
Or
A_rcraft Yawed Lett A_rcraft Yawed R_gr_{
B Other
90rq 75r"1 60[] .s[] 301"-I _51"qorq is[] 30r'l 4_[] son 75FI901-;
11 Principal Impact Greun¢l Scar Length 112 Pnncipa! Impact Ground Scar Dep_ 13 Fuselage Tolatly DeslToyed
t [] Leve_ _ [] None
A Up __deg. A __feet
B Down __¢ieg. B Diner
C Other
14 Cockpit Damage (Mulhple entry) 15 FWD Cabin Damage
I [] Destroyed 5 [] Burnt 1 [] Destroyed
2 [--J Collapsed 6 [] In{act 2 [] Co}lapsed
3 [] Part collapsed 7 [] None 3 [] Part collapsed
4 [] Distorted A Other 4 [] Distorted
17 Fu_dalge Split 18 Fu,_lage $_il Betline Seat tt
1 [] No /Go to DtOCk 19)
2 [] Longitudinal
3 [] Circumferential '
A Other
Exll
LOCL .,on
21 Cockpil-Lett
22 CoCkpit Right
23 1L
24 1R
25 2L
26 2R
27 3L
28 3R
29 4L
30 4R
31 5L
32 5R
A Other
[] None
A __ mches
8 Ot_er
( Mult_Ole entry)
5 [] Burnt
6 [] Intact
7 [] None
A Other
19 Fuselage Collapse (Estimated)
1 [] None
A Horizontal __inches
8 Vertical __ inches
C Other
---
1 [] Yes (Go to block36)
2[]No
A Other
16 AFT Cairn Damage (MuitlpJe entry)
1 [] Destroyed 5 [] Burnt
2 [] Co_lapse_ 6 [] Intact
3 [] Part collapsed 7 [] None
4 [] Distorted A Other
A C E
Type of Exit Ol_raOle Fire Damage
20 F uNtage Cruah
1 2 3 B 1
ODor Window Hatch Other Yes
I [] None
A Horizontal --inches
B Ve_cal __inches
C Other
G
Impact Oamage
2 D 1 2 F 1 2 H
No Other Yes No Other Yes No Other
,L l34 6R
NTSB Form 6120.4 Supplement I p.84> Page 2
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Attachment 7
DOT Report
NTSB AccidenUIncident Number
Supplemenl M--Search/Rescue/Firefighting/Medical Treatment
Search and Resct_ 1 [] NoneConducted(Go to moc_ 76)
2 Type of Search Conducted t Mumple entryt
I [] A,r 3 [] Sea
2 [] Ground 4 [] Informal
A Other
5 Aircraft/Occupants Located
A (Nos. forM. D Y_
B _ Local time
C Other
9 Dislreaa Call Transmitted
( Multtole entry)
1 [] None transmdted
2 [] Prior tO acctden[
3 [] After _mpaet/acc=dent
A Other
4 Search Agency Notified
A (Nos lot M. D, Y)
B _ Local time
C Other
7 Civil Air Patrol Involved in Search 8 Military or Coast Guard Personnel Involved
I [] Yes , [] Yes
2 [] No 2[]No
A Other A Other
10 Distress Call Received
fMulnpJe entry)
1 [] None received
2 [] Prior tO acc_clent
3 [] After _mpacVaccldenl
A Other
12 Condition of Aircraft Occupants at'Reicue fMultiple entry)
1 [] Located alive 6 [] Able to assist wlth locating
2 [] Located deceased.
3 [] Locateci ahve-died later
4 [] Died awmting rescue
5 [] Located ahve-trapped
7 [] Left scene-successfully located
8 [] Left scene-unsuccessful in finding aid
9 [] Left scene-unsuccessful in finding aid--died _ater
A diner
11 Method of Locating Accident Site (Mumple entry)
t [] ELT
2 [] HFradio 7 [] Visualsigiltmgofslgnal/
3 [] VHF radio smoke/fire
4 [] UHFradio 8 [] SARsatelhte
5 [] Visual sighting of wreckage 9 [] ATC computer generated
6 [] Visual siglltmg of occupants A Other
13 Weather Conditions--Indicate
Most Severe TempetalutetWind
Chill Condition During Search
A Temperature __ ° F
B Wind/ch*ll factor __ ° F
C Other
Fire Fighting 16
17 FireflghUng Unit Nollllld
(Nos. for M. D. Y)
B_
C Other
__ Local time
Firefighting Agents
22 Prolein Foam
23 Dry Chemical
24 Carbon Dioxide
25 AFFF (Lira Water)
26 Water
26 fSpecffy)
18 Firs! Flrellghtlng Unit
ArrlwDd
Local time
r'] None Conducted (Go to block 31)
19 Flmflghtlng Units
Responding
(Multil_le entry)
1 [] A_rport
A Other 2 [] Municipal
3 [] Mihtary
A Other
20 Fireflcjhling Units Assisted
Evacuation
1 [] Yes
21--] No
A Other
21 Fire Extingui_ted
Local t_me
A Other
A Avadable C Used
1 Yes 2 NO B Other 1 Yes 2 NO D Other
NTSB Form 6120.4 Supplement M ,:_-a4l Page
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C
_upplemen! S--Aircrafl
-- -- .......... "-" Seat Ad¢l_ D
A Name No, (C_ty & State) Crew
Attachment
DOT Report
NTSB Accident/Incident Number
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
!14
15
16
17
18
19
121
22
23
NTSB Form 6120.4 Supplement S (1-84}
m/B
F
E Non-
Passenger Occupant
H Oegnle of Iniury
G 4 3 2
FAA Fatal Senous Minor
t 1
None
Page 1
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ATTACHMENTS
. Excerpt from the House of Representatives, 1st Session, Report 99-212.
Department of Housing and Urban Development Independent Agencies
Appropriation Bill, 1986, Page 44.
, NTSB form 6120.4, Sup. A, Page 1, Block 56, ELT Reason for
Noneffectiveness/Failure.
° FAA ELT Field Test Procedure/Data Sheet.
. Alaskan ELT Survey, Letter from Alaskan Region FAA Office to HQ ARRS,
Scott AFB, Illinois, dated December 30, 1987.
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............... J l .......1st Session HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 99-212
Attachment 1
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSh-NG AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT-
INDEPENDENT AGENCIES APPROPRIATION BILL, 1986
JULY 18, 1985.--Committed to the Committee of the Whsle House on the S_-ate of
the Union and ordered to be printed
Mr. BOLA_-D, from the Committee on Appropriations,
submitted the following
REPORT
[To accompany H.R. 3038]
The Committee on Appropriations-submits the following report
in explanation of the accompanying bill making appropriations for
the Department of Housing and Urban Development, and for
sundry independent agencies, boards, commissions, corporations,
and offices for the fiacal year ending September 30, 1986, and for
other purposes.
INDEX TO BILL AND REPORT
Title I--Department of.Housing and Urban Development .......................
Title H--Independent Agencies:
American Battle Monuments Commission ...........................................
Consumer Product Safety Commission ................................................
Cemeterial Expenses, Army ....................................................................
Environmental Protection Agency .........................................................
Council on Environmental Quality ........................................................
• Office of Science and Technology Policy ...............................................
Federal Emergency Management Agency ............................................
Consumer Information Center ................................................................
Office of Consumer Affairs ....................................................................
National Aeronautics and Space Administration ................................
National Credit Union Administration ..................................................
National Science Foundation ...................................................................
Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation .............................................
Selective Service System ..........................................................................
Department of the Treasury ....................................................................
Veterans Adrnfniatration ..........................................................................
50-177 O
Page humor
Bill R_per_
2 4
13 19
14 19
15 21
15 21
17 29
17 30
18 30
23 4O
24 41
24 41
27 47
28 47
31 5I
31 51
32 52
32 53
9O
In connection with the ongoing search and rescue program, the
Committee is pleased that NASA has progressed to an operationM
status and supports the continued carriage of search and rescue in-
struments on National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Adminis-
tration polar orbiting weather satellites. The Committee also
strongly supports the NASA concept of a backup satellite carrying
search and rescue instruments which was described in hearings on
the 1986 appropriation. This satellite would ensure that the United
States' commitments to the international search and rescue pro-
gram could be met even if an early failure of the NOA_k satellite or
a search and rescue instrument occurred. It is understood that a
study is underway to examine the feasibility and cost of a backup
satellite, and the Committee requests that NASA provide a copy of
the study when it is completed. Further, the Agency is urged to
proceed with the development of this satellite as soon as possible so
that United States' international commitments can be met.
The Committee also recognizes and supports the continuing
NASA effort to provide for system improvements such as the devel-
opment of new distress transmitters, specifically desig-ned for satel-
lite detection, global coverage, and the possibility of instantaneous
detection using geosyncronous satellites. It is hoped that this work
wiU proceed as rapidly as technology will permit.
Finally, the Committee strongly urges that some improvements
to the presently deployed emergency locator transmitters should be
addressed. It is not satisfactory that units with a false alarm rate
of over 97 percent and a non-activation rate of 70 percent continue
to be mandated by the Federal government when an improved
technical standard has been developed and can be provided for re-
spective satellite monitoring. It is recognized that NASA cannot
initiate the necessary administrative action to mandate improved
transmitters, but as the developer of the satellite system, NASA
should urge the Federal Aviation Administration to proceed and
should make available technical expertise to support any FAA ini-
tiative in this area.
SPACE FLIGHT CONTROL AND DATA COMMUNICATIONS
19$5 appropriation ........................................................................................$3,601,800,000
Estimate, 1986 ...............................................................................................3,509,900,000
Recommended in bill....................................................................................3,402,900,000
Decrease below estimate ..............................................................................-107,000,000
The space flight control and data communications account in-
cludes the program elements that provide for the national fleet of
space shuttle orbiters,including main engines, launch siteand mis-
slon operations, control requirements, initial spares,"production
tooling, and related supporting activities.This account also pro-
vides the standard operational support services for the space shut-
tle and the expendable launch vehicles, and includes trac'Idng,te-
lemetry, command, and data acquisition support required to meet
all NASA flightprojects.
The Committee recommends a total of $3,402,900,000 for this ac-
tivity in fiscalyear 1986. This is a decrease of $!07,000,000 below
the budget request and is $198,900,000 below the ICS5 aoorr,nri_.-
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Attachment 2
svm_m_m._
Fuel Tanks
33 Left Wing
34 Right Wing
35 Left Tip
36 Right Tip
37 Fuselage
38 _SpecHy )
National Transportation Safety Board
FACTUAL REPORT
AVIATION
Fuel on 80arQ at Accident
A Gallonsi B Gallons C
Estimated I Vent ed O_er
NTS8 Acc|denUIncJdent Numl:ler
41 Fuel Found In _1 Engine t Multtole entry)
1 [] None 7 [] Filterls)
2 [] Lines 8 [] Selector valve
3 [] Gascolatortstramer 9 [] Fuel man,toldlspider
4 [] Carburetor/fuelinlector 10 [] Accumulator tanK
5 [] Engine driven )ump
6 [] Auxiliary fuel pump A Other
.111 [*i ill[lli Is[:.] IP:III ,i! I|,[i|lliil;llri.[,
iBm
D Tank Construct=on F SolllSafe F_tt]nqs H Fuel LeaKage/Rupture
Wincj Bladder Metal Yes No Other None Une Fltttng Tank Othe_
i
I
42 Fuel Found In #2 Engine (Mult/o_e entr)/I
1 [] None 7 ["J Filterls)
2 [] Lines 8 [] Selector valve
3 [] Gascoiator/stralner 9 [] Fuel manffoldJs!older
4 [] Carburetor/fuel=niector 10 [] Accumulator tank
5 [] Engine driven pump
6 [] Auxiliar.tuelpump A Other
43 Flight Controls, 44 Aimme/StruCura, Evi_ ol In-Flll_t Separatlon/Faitm
Evidence or
OpereUonal Failure
or Meifunctlon
( Multiole entry)
1 [] None
2 [] Pitch control _
3 [] Roll control
45 I:h'omdle¢, Ewden¢=
(Multiple entry) of In-Fltgllt
1 [] None 7 [] Right stab/elevator Se_Fadure
2 [] Helicopter(Complete Supp. G)8 [] Vertical fin/rudder I [] Yes
3 [] General disintegration 9 [] Canard 2 [-I No
4 [] Left wing 10 [] Powerplant A Other
5 [] Right wing .11 [] Cabin/cargo door
6 [] Left stab/elevator A Other
46 Pov_q_mt, Evidence
Of In-Ftlght Mechanical =
Malfunction
1 [] Yes
21_No
A Other
4 [] Yaw control i47 Fuel, Evl_ ot Improper Grade or Coetlmlnetlon 48 O11, Evl¢lea= of Impmt=e¢ Grade or Coetamlnstlk_t
A Oti_er I (Multiple entry) (Multiple entry]
I 1 [] None 3 r_ Contamination 1 [] None 3 I--I Contamination
'I 2 [] Improper grade A Other 2 [] Improper grade A Other
51 ELT Manufacturer 52 ELT Model No. $5 I_ ELl i(Ii (Mull/pie entry)
A Otl_er
53 ELT Battery Type
I [] Alkaline 4 [] Nickel
2 [] Cadmium 5 [] Lithium
3 [] Nicad A Other
A Diner
=;4 ELT Battery Expiration Date (Nos. for M, D, Y)
A Diner
1 [] Cockpit
2 [] Cabin 5 [] Raft
3 [] Tailcone 6 [] Survival Kit
4 [] Empennage A Other
56 ELT-Realon for NoneffecUvenesa/Failure (Multiple entry)
t [] Operated effectively 6 [] Batteryinstallat_on_ncorrect It [] Watersubmers_on
2 [] InsufficientG's 7 [] Incorrect battery 12 [] Unit not armed
3 [] Improper installation 8 [] Fire damage 13 [] Smelded by wreckage
4 [] Battery dead 9 [] Impact _amage 14 [] Sh,elded by terra,n
5 [] Battery corroded 10 [] Antenna broken/disconnected 15 [] Internalfarture
16 [] Test satisfactorily after accident
17 [] Signal direction altered by terrain
18 [] Packing device Still installed
19 [] Remote switch off
A Other
NTSB Form 6120.4 Supplement A (_-8=) Page 2
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ELT F--_L_ T_T PROC'--D_IDATA S_T
AtZachment 3
1. _s the ELT mounted rigidly in all axes and in the direction for
crash activation? YES __, NO
Describe mounting:
2. _etermine the position{s) of the ELT switch and remote switch,
if installed. Remove the ELT from the aircraft. Swltch(es) should
be in the off position before removing.
ELT SWITCH: ON __, OFF __, _KMED, OTHER __
K_MOTE SW_TCH: ON __, OFF __, AR/!ED__, C."__ZvX __
3. Perform a func:ional check by activating the ELT with a quick rap
from _he palm of the hand in the direction of force ac%ivation.
(The EBC 202 and TSO-Cg!a ELT's can be activated by using a forward
throwing motion coupled by a rapid reversing action. The ARNAV
ELT-100 also requires j_mping pins Nos. 5 & 8) Turn off the ELT
as soon as the ELT's signal is verified by any convenient means:
OK __, Not OK __
4. inspect the mounting, the ELT, and disassembled battery pack for
corrosion, defects, etc. Photograph the best view(s] of the ELT
and battery pack. OK __, Not OK
5. Connect the reassembled ELT to a war=meter. Wrap the ELT and
connections in aluminum foil to minimize _he emission of spurious
_F energy. Activate the ELT for three minutes and record power
output: Start mw Finish mw This should
be greater than 75mw (50mw for TSO-Cg!a) .
6. After removing foil, secure _he ELT to the G-switch go/no go test
fixture. Perform the G-switch test with the ELT armed; the point
of activation _s verified by use of the wattmeter or any other
convenient means (see operating instruc_ious).
ACTIVATED WITHIN L_MITS: YES __, NO
ZF NO: TKAVELAZOt_/BELOW H_GHLOWLIMIT SWITCH IN.
Mote: Operation of _he test fixture (cannot be used for TSO-C91a}
requires some set-up technique and should be demonstrated to
personnel who are using it for the first time.
7. Inspect antenna(s), wire terminals, etc: OK, Not OK
8. Reinstall the ELT. Turn on the ELT (use remote switch if
installed) and determine if the antenna(s) radiates a strong
signal. The signal can be heard through an AM broadcast receiver
(any frequency) held about 6 inches away from the anten/%a(s). A
field strength meter may also be used to measure a radiated field
of a leas_ 1 volt/meter or equivalent.
OK __, Not OK
9. Keset the ELT: OK
94
ELT FIELD TEST PROCEDURE/DATA SH_ZT
Location
Date
Person performing the test
AIRPLANE
Manufacturer
Model #
Rag #
Inspection Program
Last Insp Da_e
Ops/hrs Las_ Insp
_NTENNA
Location
Manufacturer
Model #
Ser #
Part #
TSO #
EL__ T
Location
Manufacturer
Weight
Model.._
Set #
Part #
TSO #
Installation Date
ATTACH
PHOTO(S)
KEXE
BATTERY PACK
.Manufacturer
Model#
Set #
Part #
TSO #
Expiration Date
Installation Da_e
REMOTE SWITCH, if installed
COMMENTS RECOMMENDATIONS DESCRIPTION OF ITEMS NOT OK
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®
E_c!osu=e C7)
O
I_am_m ,m_san
A_Zachmen_ 4
_3
_Ii_-_. _,-.o _. _. :_
Dece,-_ec 30, 1987
Colonel _obe_= w_-_
Headquar:_rs AR._S
Scot: ._-3, !L 6.__.-.009
Oear Co!_ne! _ichaelson_
As _er conve.'sa:ion =i=h Ga.-7 3enne_: of Nor:he.-_.. L/g_:s Av.on_.s, • am
enc!osi=g :he "_.--"check resulcs col!ac:ed =hroughouc 1987. ,T ve also
iacl_ded some FC_ and _TS_ da:a :._a_ _igh: be of assistance.
I would also ad,_se =hac 7ou com:ac: _.h!!!Ip J. Ak_cs, Zag_:e_i:g
Di_isio_-.%/rcraS_ Ca_i_icac!:c, F_-OOT, _S-_20, 800 L,_epe_de.ucs Ave=ue
Y_, _ash!=ETon D.C. 2059L. I have been prov__il:_ _r. _k4rs _he same
i_5_r'_a:iou for possible preparaclon o£ _oci:s o_ proposed _!e=akinE
c=nce._--i=g :es_i=g suandar_s for E_:'s. Our prog:;m in ;3.asEa appa_enu!y
has caused a loc o_ conceru and i:_eresu from all angles, am:L i: v_u!d be
m_re siE_iflcan_ i_ all simlar!y concs_-_e_ paE:i_s ¢ou!_ uni:_ :heir
_!ease le_ me know vhac _ can do :: fur:he: ass!s," Zou.
$i=cere!y,
7alerie Arou
kc:iden: Preven=i_n $peclalis:
EuclosuEes
CC: ?b/llp J. ,_Ice:s
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."..EE/ff0DEL .:LE5L'L_-S SIN
_-_-Z
EL: _ST F.E3_DT..:S
NM.C3
FOI NT'_.
SKa.KC-7
NA/CO
E3C 102.
E3C I01.-1.
--3C ! (3Z
PO.'.NT-'I
NARCO EL'-IO
P(3Z'_R 3000
L_CO
sHARC- 7
P(3IN."ZE C-4000
SH_ZC-T
?0L',I_ 3000
Po LV%'_ 300O
PoINCF.& 3000
CIRZI-2
DH ELT !-3
_MA/.j_Y
E3C 102.a.
EHC I 02..a.
.w.A/LT'EC_
_CO KL_-I0
SRA2J:-7
SFJ_J:-7
N_.RCO KI..T-I 0
P.._ _'_-l::_ K3-Z.BLO
LARGO
NARCQ
DH EL=-5
E3C- i0Z
DH
POI_..!
DM
COH. COMPONL_.5
POZNTF_ 3000
SEARC-7
LARAGO
C:2-i0-30
RZ3CUE 88
PCZ:_T-R 3000
OK
DE.L_ 3ATTE._RY
OK
BA--TE._Z_'ESNOT HOOKED UP
I969 HA--Z'E.--ZY
E'_Z3-'S ;/!/H.
OK
NO "C" ACT
INCP-8ENT TC FACT_EY ._098Z
CA'JSE3 INTErfERENCE :N RADIOS/_TLrR.NED-FACT(3Ry 325254
DF_L] BA."TE._R " -S 7:41
DF__D BA_--I'.ER-E S 14083
DE._2. BA..'TERIES 401390
DE._D 8ATZ-E.:.Z:ES I459ZE
CALTSES ::L-ER/ER/.NCE/CUST_HER DI._CDNNEC._D _ &
USED PERSONAL ELT
CAUSES I._.ER/ERENCE/SENT TO FACTORY 32625Z
CAgSE5 ZNTE-_ER.ENCZ/SENT TO FACTORY 3ZZ096
INOP/SZNT T0 FACT(3RY 25455
CCERECTED-"G" 5"&ITCH 8ROK:.'_/&N_--_A _OUNT LOOEZ/
5"&ITCH W0N 'T STAY ON
LOW PCWEZ/ DOWNS',,'E:.__ WRONG KK."/I FOSSZ3LZ LOW
BATT./ LTN_LE TO ,_T._Sb'ELEDIE I'0 DESIGN
DEAD _T_.-_R_,rS (6 ,_0_ :LEFT)
DEAD 3A.--:_'.---=I.I.ZS/BA.I":_.Y _IRZ, D !0 rm-JdlS
BA.__TERYCONNECTION LOOSe/ PLUG FELL OFF _,'_
TOUC_._ED/PLNS ON S&.--_...KYSM_EED 0PLN AND NOT
GRASPING CONNECTOR
LOW .:_0WER/BA.TTZ.:.RIZS,,'K,LK/%,'0U?.D_3T COME I_
VCL:AGE
L_OP
"G" S'_ITC_ LNOP/ WIT CORRODED
UNIT LN OF.-"POSITION IN _T_./ C_CKT.D OK
LNOP/3A.-T_._RYDEAD & OUT OF na.-Z 10918
_ZTCH 660095
NO gJEEP/POk--:.Ri/_/ _LTYZZY OK/S_ TO F_OIY 7167
T-TE2P.INAL LOOSE/ PC IIO_t_D COP.J_ODKD _I$0
INOP/ BAI'TERIZS EXPLKF.D UNIT ACTS IN A//_/ T_m_n 9079
WON'T TURN 0N/SENT TO FACTORY 644_Z
INOP/BA.'T':_RIESOK/ TRAZKED 33_37
BATTERIES 0K/POWER 70 mW/CUST_ SEND TO F_'TO_ 307737
'G' SNITCH RAI'T'._.INGAROUND/CE,_./ PLN COAX F_/.L
IN FLMALE."-- 499
AL;,'AYSON/SENT TO FACTORY 4709
COHPLETELY R_/STED/T_OW AWAY 31_949
NO "G" ACTION/"G" SWITCH LOOSE/POWER LOW i_38._7
DIDN'T GO 0FF iN ACCIDENT/-LEADS CORRODED OFF/
REPAZ._LEDAND REPLACED BATTERY 2S47
NO OL'TPL'T/INCP/TR._SEED NSN
iN__._..... N. INOP/WAS FOUND ON ANNUAL 75C6265
INCP/FI:iZZ X,_.ITTZR/BAO FINAL 320175
414/_T
.4/4/s7
4/4/s7
4/418T
41_18T
41_18;"
_I_I_7
%/2._/87
6124187
6/;_4/87
8ti3187
7/I/87
7/?./87
7/7/87
7/15/87
7/17/87
7120187
7/27187
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,L:;',':::....::;..(.?L;ALITY...
.,AXZ/MoDrr
La2_GO
:.4/_GO
PCL4T_
_KARC-7
POr.NT_ 3000
_ART
t-:'_:-! 005--_
PCZ:r__R _000
_3C 102._
C:_RC,%_LI.0T ACR/
?_C3-i01
E3C I02C
DART Ii
NA_C0-EL='- i0
NARCO-EL.'- I 0
C3.'4..COMPONENTS
SF_'-,AC-7
Y&._I,C- 7
SH._C-7
SPL._C-T
_M EL=-6
?OIN_
POL_!"Z_
?oLT'_'..2
?o.:._IYI'E.?,.
NAZC3_-I0
NA.-R.C0 -..-."L:'-I.0
_4aRCO---.-'L=-IO"
E3C 102_
NARCO_-I0
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